{"id":3649,"date":"2022-11-15T22:19:32","date_gmt":"2022-11-15T19:19:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/?p=3649"},"modified":"2025-08-09T18:46:35","modified_gmt":"2025-08-09T15:46:35","slug":"2007-2008-finansal-krizi-3","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/2007-2008-finansal-krizi-3\/","title":{"rendered":"2007 – 2008 Finansal Krizi – 3"},"content":{"rendered":"

Yaz\u0131n\u0131n \u00d6nceki B\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fc :
\n2007 \u2013 2008 Finansal Krizi \u2013 2 i\u00e7in t\u0131klay\u0131n<\/a><\/p>\n

Yanl\u0131\u015f Risk Fiyatland\u0131rmas\u0131<\/h2>\n

Mortgage riskleri, son 50 y\u0131l\u0131n tarihsel e\u011filimlerinden yola \u00e7\u0131karak konut fiyatlar\u0131n\u0131n d\u00fc\u015fme olas\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 hafife alarak, ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7tan yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131ya kadar olan zincirdeki hemen hemen t\u00fcm kurumlar taraf\u0131ndan k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fcmsenmi\u015ftir.\u00a0 Fiyatland\u0131rma modellerinin kalbi olan temerr\u00fct ve \u00f6n \u00f6deme modellerinin s\u0131n\u0131rlamalar\u0131, ipotek ve varl\u0131\u011fa dayal\u0131 \u00fcr\u00fcnlerin ve bunlar\u0131n t\u00fcrevlerinin yarat\u0131c\u0131lar, menkul k\u0131ymetle\u015ftiriciler, broker-bayiler, derecelendirme kurulu\u015flar\u0131, sigorta \u015firketleri ve yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131lar\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00e7o\u011funlu\u011fu taraf\u0131ndan a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 de\u011ferlenmesine yol a\u00e7m\u0131\u015ft\u0131r (belirli y\u00fcksek riskli yat\u0131r\u0131m fonlar\u0131<\/a> hari\u00e7). Finansal t\u00fcrevler ve yap\u0131land\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015f \u00fcr\u00fcnler, finansal kat\u0131l\u0131mc\u0131lar aras\u0131nda riskin b\u00f6l\u00fcnmesine ve kayd\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131na yard\u0131mc\u0131 olurken, d\u00fc\u015fen konut fiyatlar\u0131n\u0131n ve toplam riske yol a\u00e7an sonu\u00e7ta ortaya \u00e7\u0131kan kay\u0131plar\u0131n oldu\u011fundan az tahmin edilmesiydi.<\/p>\n

Riskin fiyatland\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131<\/a>, yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131lar\u0131n ek risk almak i\u00e7in ihtiya\u00e7 duyduklar\u0131 ve daha y\u00fcksek faiz oranlar\u0131 veya \u00fccretlerle \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fclebilen risk primini ifade eder. Baz\u0131 akademisyenler, bankalar\u0131n riske maruz kalma durumlar\u0131na ili\u015fkin \u015feffafl\u0131k eksikli\u011finin piyasalar\u0131n krizden \u00f6nce do\u011fru fiyatland\u0131rma riskini engelledi\u011fini, mortgage piyasas\u0131n\u0131n normalde olmas\u0131 gerekenden daha b\u00fcy\u00fck b\u00fcy\u00fcmesini sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve finansal krizi risk seviyeleri basit, kolayca anla\u015f\u0131labilir bir formatta a\u00e7\u0131klanm\u0131\u015f olsayd\u0131 olmas\u0131 gerekenden \u00e7ok daha y\u0131k\u0131c\u0131 hale getirdi\u011fini iddia etti.<\/p>\n

\"Wall
AIG ikramiye \u00f6demeleri tart\u0131\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131n ard\u0131ndan Wall Street’te bir protestocu haber medyas\u0131nda r\u00f6portaj yapt\u0131.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

\u00c7e\u015fitli nedenlerden \u00f6t\u00fcr\u00fc, piyasa kat\u0131l\u0131mc\u0131lar\u0131 MBS ve CDO’lar gibi finansal yeniliklerin do\u011fas\u0131nda bulunan riski do\u011fru bir \u015fekilde \u00f6l\u00e7memi\u015f veya bunun finansal sistemin genel istikrar\u0131 \u00fczerindeki etkisini anlamam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. CDO’lar i\u00e7in fiyatland\u0131rma modeli, sisteme getirdikleri risk d\u00fczeyini a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a yans\u0131tm\u0131yordu. Bankalar, “2005 sonundan 2007 ortas\u0131na kadar” 450 milyar dolarl\u0131k CDO sat\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 tahmin ediyor; tasfiye edilen 102 milyar dolar aras\u0131nda, JPMorgan, “y\u00fcksek kaliteli” CDO’lar i\u00e7in ortalama geri kazan\u0131m oran\u0131n\u0131n dolar ba\u015f\u0131na yakla\u015f\u0131k 32 sent oldu\u011funu, buna kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k ara sermaye CDO’sunun geri kazan\u0131m oran\u0131n\u0131n her dolar i\u00e7in yakla\u015f\u0131k be\u015f sent oldu\u011funu tahmin etti.<\/p>\n

AIG, kredi temerr\u00fct takaslar\u0131n\u0131n kullan\u0131lmas\u0131 yoluyla \u00e7e\u015fitli finans kurulu\u015flar\u0131n\u0131n y\u00fck\u00fcml\u00fcl\u00fcklerini sigortalad\u0131. Temel CDS i\u015flemi, B taraf\u0131n\u0131n temerr\u00fcde d\u00fc\u015fmesi durumunda taraf A’ya para \u00f6deme taahh\u00fcd\u00fc kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131nda AIG’nin prim almas\u0131n\u0131 i\u00e7eriyordu. Ancak, kriz ilerledik\u00e7e ve Eyl\u00fcl 2008’de h\u00fck\u00fcmet taraf\u0131ndan devral\u0131nd\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, AIG bir\u00e7ok CDS taahh\u00fcd\u00fcn\u00fc destekleyecek mali g\u00fcce sahip de\u011fildi. ABD vergi m\u00fckellefleri, 2008 boyunca ve 2009’un ba\u015flar\u0131nda AIG’ye 180 milyar dolar\u0131n \u00fczerinde devlet kredisi ve yat\u0131r\u0131m sa\u011flad\u0131; bu sayede para, bir\u00e7ok b\u00fcy\u00fck k\u00fcresel finans kurumu da dahil olmak \u00fczere \u00e7e\u015fitli kar\u015f\u0131 taraflara CDS i\u015flemlerine akt\u0131.<\/p>\n

Mali Kriz Ara\u015ft\u0131rma Komisyonu (FCIC) krize ili\u015fkin b\u00fcy\u00fck h\u00fck\u00fcmet ara\u015ft\u0131rmas\u0131n\u0131 yapt\u0131. Ocak 2011’de sona erdi:<\/p>\n

Komisyon, AIG’nin ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z oldu\u011fu sonucuna var\u0131r ve esas olarak, kredi temerr\u00fct takaslar\u0131n\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck sat\u0131\u015flar\u0131, ilk teminat koymadan, sermaye rezervlerini bir kenara ay\u0131rmadan veya riskten korunma yoluyla ger\u00e7ekle\u015ftirildi\u011fi i\u00e7in h\u00fck\u00fcmet taraf\u0131ndan kurtar\u0131ld\u0131- birtak\u0131m kurumsal y\u00f6neti\u015fimde, \u00f6zellikle risk y\u00f6netiminde derin bir ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011fa u\u011frayan uygulamalar. AIG’nin ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131, AIG’nin ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olma olas\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 azaltacak sermaye ve marj gereklilikleri de dahil olmak \u00fczere bu \u00fcr\u00fcnlerin federal ve eyalet d\u00fczenlemelerini etkili bir \u015fekilde ortadan kald\u0131ran, kredi temerr\u00fct takaslar\u0131 dahil, tezg\u00e2h \u00fcst\u00fc (OTC) t\u00fcrevlerin kapsaml\u0131 bir \u015fekilde serbest b\u0131rak\u0131lmas\u0131 nedeniyle m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olmu\u015ftur.<\/p>\n

Yayg\u0131n olarak kullan\u0131lan bir finansal modelin s\u0131n\u0131rlamalar\u0131 da tam olarak anla\u015f\u0131lmam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Bu form\u00fcl, CDS fiyat\u0131n\u0131n ipote\u011fe dayal\u0131 menkul k\u0131ymetlerin fiyat\u0131yla ili\u015fkili oldu\u011funu ve do\u011fru fiyat\u0131n\u0131 tahmin edebilece\u011fini varsay\u0131yordu. Olduk\u00e7a izlenebilir oldu\u011fu i\u00e7in, CDO ve CDS yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n, ihra\u00e7\u00e7\u0131lar\u0131n ve derecelendirme kurulu\u015flar\u0131n\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck bir y\u00fczdesi taraf\u0131ndan h\u0131zla kullan\u0131lmaya ba\u015fland\u0131. Bir wired.com makalesine g\u00f6re:<\/p>\n

\u201c\u2026Sonra model par\u00e7aland\u0131. Mali piyasalar, Li’nin form\u00fcl\u00fcn\u00fc kullananlar\u0131n beklemedi\u011fi \u015fekilde davranmaya ba\u015flad\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, \u00e7atlaklar erken ortaya \u00e7\u0131kmaya ba\u015flad\u0131. Mali sistemin kurulu\u015fundaki k\u0131r\u0131lmalar\u0131n trilyonlarca dolar\u0131 yutmas\u0131 ve k\u00fcresel bankac\u0131l\u0131k sisteminin hayatta kalmas\u0131n\u0131 ciddi tehlikeye soktu\u011fu 2008’de \u00e7atlaklar tam te\u015fekk\u00fcll\u00fc kanyonlar haline geldi… Li’nin Gaussian copula form\u00fcl\u00fc, d\u00fcnya finans sistemini dize getiren ak\u0131l almaz kay\u0131plara yol a\u00e7mada bir ara\u00e7 olarak tarihe ge\u00e7ecek.\u201d<\/p>\n

Finansal varl\u0131klar daha karma\u015f\u0131k hale geldik\u00e7e ve de\u011ferlemesi zorla\u015ft\u0131k\u00e7a, uluslararas\u0131 tahvil derecelendirme kurulu\u015flar\u0131 ve banka d\u00fczenleyicilerinin risklerin ger\u00e7ekte oldu\u011fundan \u00e7ok daha k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck oldu\u011funu g\u00f6steren baz\u0131 karma\u015f\u0131k matematiksel modelleri ge\u00e7erli olarak kabul etmeleri yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131lar\u0131 rahatlatt\u0131. George Soros, “Yeni \u00fcr\u00fcnler o kadar karma\u015f\u0131k hale geldi\u011finde s\u00fcper patlama kontrolden \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131, yetkililer art\u0131k riskleri hesaplayamaz hale geldi ve bankalar\u0131n kendi risk y\u00f6netimi y\u00f6ntemlerine g\u00fcvenmeye ba\u015flad\u0131. Benzer \u015fekilde, derecelendirme kurulu\u015flar\u0131 da sentetik \u00fcr\u00fcnlerin yarat\u0131c\u0131lar\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan sa\u011flanan bilgilere dayan\u0131yordu. Bu, \u015fok edici bir sorumluluktan vazge\u00e7meydi. ”<\/p>\n

Yat\u0131r\u0131m y\u00f6netimi profesyonelleri ile kurumsal yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131lar aras\u0131ndaki \u00e7\u0131kar \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131, yat\u0131r\u0131m sermayesinde k\u00fcresel bir bolluk ile birle\u015fti\u011finde, varl\u0131k y\u00f6neticilerinin a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 fiyatl\u0131 kredi varl\u0131klar\u0131na k\u00f6t\u00fc yat\u0131r\u0131m yapmalar\u0131na yol a\u00e7t\u0131. Profesyonel yat\u0131r\u0131m y\u00f6neticilerine genellikle y\u00f6netim alt\u0131ndaki m\u00fc\u015fteri varl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n hacmine g\u00f6re \u00f6deme yap\u0131l\u0131r. Bu nedenle, varl\u0131k y\u00f6neticilerinin, \u00fccretlerini en \u00fcst d\u00fczeye \u00e7\u0131karmak i\u00e7in y\u00f6netim alt\u0131ndaki varl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 geni\u015fletmeleri i\u00e7in bir te\u015fvik vard\u0131r. K\u00fcresel yat\u0131r\u0131m sermayesindeki bolluk, kredi varl\u0131klar\u0131 \u00fczerindeki getirilerin d\u00fc\u015fmesine neden oldu\u011fu i\u00e7in, varl\u0131k y\u00f6neticileri, getirilerin ger\u00e7ek kredi riskini yans\u0131tmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 varl\u0131klara yat\u0131r\u0131m yapma veya m\u00fc\u015fterilere fon iade etme se\u00e7ene\u011fiyle kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya kald\u0131lar. Bir\u00e7ok varl\u0131k y\u00f6neticisi, varl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 y\u00f6netim alt\u0131nda tutabilmek i\u00e7in, m\u00fc\u015fterilerinin zarar\u0131na olacak \u015fekilde, m\u00fc\u015fteri fonlar\u0131n\u0131 a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 fiyatl\u0131 (d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck getirili) yat\u0131r\u0131mlara yat\u0131rmaya devam etti. Bu se\u00e7imi, y\u00fcksek risk bazl\u0131 kredi varl\u0131klar\u0131 ile ili\u015fkili risklerin “makul bir ink\u00e2r edilebilirli\u011fi” ile desteklediler \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc y\u00fcksek riskli kredilerin erken “vintages” ile ilgili zarar deneyimi \u00e7ok d\u00fc\u015f\u00fckt\u00fc.<\/p>\n

Yukar\u0131daki form\u00fcl\u00fcn hakimiyetine ra\u011fmen, finansal end\u00fcstrinin krizden \u00f6nce form\u00fcl s\u0131n\u0131rlamalar\u0131n\u0131, \u00f6zellikle de ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131k dinamiklerinin eksikli\u011fi ve a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 olaylar\u0131n zay\u0131f temsilini ele almak i\u00e7in belgelenmi\u015f giri\u015fimleri vard\u0131r. 2007 y\u0131l\u0131nda World Scientific<\/a> taraf\u0131ndan yay\u0131nlanan “Kredi Korelasyonu: Copulas’tan Sonra Ya\u015fam” adl\u0131 cilt, birka\u00e7 uygulay\u0131c\u0131n\u0131n birka\u00e7 uygulay\u0131c\u0131n\u0131n baz\u0131 kopula s\u0131n\u0131rlamalar\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fczelten modeller \u00f6nermeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131klar\u0131, Londra’da Merrill Lynch taraf\u0131ndan d\u00fczenlenen 2006 tarihli bir konferans\u0131 \u00f6zetlemektedir. Ayr\u0131ca bkz: Donnelly ve Embrechts’in makalesi ve Brigo, Pallavicini ve Torresetti’nin CDO’lar hakk\u0131nda 2006’da yay\u0131nlanan ilgili uyar\u0131lar\u0131 ve ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar\u0131 bildiren kitab\u0131<\/p>\n

G\u00f6lge Bankac\u0131l\u0131k Sisteminin Patlamas\u0131 ve \u00c7\u00f6kmesi<\/h2>\n

En riskli, en k\u00f6t\u00fc performans g\u00f6steren ipoteklerin “g\u00f6lge bankac\u0131l\u0131k sistemi” ile finanse edildi\u011fine ve g\u00f6lge bankac\u0131l\u0131k sisteminden gelen rekabetin, daha geleneksel kurumlara y\u00fcklenim standartlar\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrmeleri ve daha riskli krediler olu\u015fturmalar\u0131 i\u00e7in bask\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015f olabilece\u011fine dair g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc kan\u0131tlar var.<\/p>\n

\"Menkul
Menkul k\u0131ymetle\u015ftirme piyasalar\u0131 kriz s\u0131ras\u0131nda bozuldu.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

New York Federal Rezerv Bankas\u0131 Ba\u015fkan\u0131 ve CEO’su Timothy Geithner -sonras\u0131nda 2009’da ABD Hazine Bakan\u0131 oldu- Haziran 2008’de yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir konu\u015fmada, kredi piyasalar\u0131n\u0131n dondurulmas\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6nemli bir su\u00e7unu, g\u00f6lge bankac\u0131l\u0131k sistemi olarak da adland\u0131r\u0131lan “paralel” bankac\u0131l\u0131k sistemindeki varl\u0131klar \u00fczerinde bir “gidi\u015fatta” su\u00e7lad\u0131. Bu kurulu\u015flar, finansal sistemi destekleyen kredi piyasalar\u0131 i\u00e7in kritik hale geldi, ancak ayn\u0131 d\u00fczenleyici kontrollere tabi de\u011fillerdi. Ayr\u0131ca, bu varl\u0131klar Varl\u0131k-y\u00fck\u00fcml\u00fcl\u00fck uyumsuzlu\u011fundan dolay\u0131 savunmas\u0131zd\u0131, bu da uzun vadeli, likit olmayan ve riskli varl\u0131klar\u0131 sat\u0131n almak i\u00e7in likit piyasalardan k\u0131sa vadeli bor\u00e7 ald\u0131klar\u0131 anlam\u0131na geliyordu. Bu, kredi piyasalar\u0131ndaki aksakl\u0131klar\u0131n, onlar\u0131, uzun vadeli varl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck fiyatlardan satarak, h\u0131zl\u0131 bir \u015fekilde kald\u0131ra\u00e7 kald\u0131rmaya zorlayaca\u011f\u0131 anlam\u0131na geliyordu. Bu varl\u0131klar\u0131n \u00f6nemini \u015f\u00f6yle anlatt\u0131:<\/p>\n

2007’nin ba\u015flar\u0131nda, yap\u0131land\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015f yat\u0131r\u0131m ara\u00e7lar\u0131nda, a\u00e7\u0131k art\u0131rma oranl\u0131 tercihli menkul k\u0131ymetlerde, ihale opsiyonlu tahvillerde ve de\u011fi\u015fken faizli vadesiz senetlerde varl\u0131\u011fa dayal\u0131 ticari k\u00e2\u011f\u0131t kanallar\u0131, kabaca 2,2 trilyon dolarl\u0131k bir toplam varl\u0131k b\u00fcy\u00fckl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcne sahipti. \u00dc\u00e7 partili repo ile bir gecede finanse
\nedilen varl\u0131klar 2,5 trilyon dolara \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Hedge fonlarda tutulan varl\u0131klar kabaca 1.8 trilyon dolara \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. En b\u00fcy\u00fck be\u015f yat\u0131r\u0131m bankas\u0131n\u0131n birle\u015fik bilan\u00e7olar\u0131 4 trilyon dolar\u0131 buldu. Kar\u015f\u0131la\u015ft\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, Amerika Birle\u015fik
\nDevletleri’ndeki en b\u00fcy\u00fck be\u015f banka holding \u015firketinin toplam varl\u0131klar\u0131 o noktada 6 trilyon dolar\u0131n biraz \u00fczerindeydi ve t\u00fcm bankac\u0131l\u0131k sisteminin toplam varl\u0131klar\u0131 yakla\u015f\u0131k 10 trilyon dolard\u0131. Bu fakt\u00f6rlerin birle\u015fik etkisi, kendi kendini g\u00fc\u00e7lendiren varl\u0131k fiyat\u0131 ve kredi d\u00f6ng\u00fclerine kar\u015f\u0131 savunmas\u0131z bir finansal sistemdi.<\/p>\n

\"\"
\nTimothy Geithner
\nPresident of the Federal Reserve Bank
\nof New York (2003 – 2009)<\/p>\n

Ekonomi Bilimleri Nobel Anma \u00d6d\u00fcl\u00fc sahibi ekonomist Paul Krugman, g\u00f6lge bankac\u0131l\u0131k sistemindeki ko\u015fuyu krize neden olan “olanlar\u0131n \u00f6z\u00fc” olarak nitelendirdi. Bu kontrol eksikli\u011finden “k\u00f6t\u00fc niyetli ihmal” olarak bahsetti ve d\u00fczenlemenin t\u00fcm bankac\u0131l\u0131k benzeri faaliyetlere empoze edilmesi gerekti\u011fini savundu. \u00c7o\u011fu ipote\u011fe dayal\u0131 menkul k\u0131ymetler veya varl\u0131\u011fa dayal\u0131 ticari senetler kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131nda yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131 fonlar\u0131 elde etme yetene\u011fi olmadan, yat\u0131r\u0131m bankalar\u0131 ve g\u00f6lge bankac\u0131l\u0131k sistemindeki di\u011fer varl\u0131klar ipotek firmalar\u0131na ve di\u011fer \u015firketlere fon sa\u011flayamazlard\u0131.<\/p>\n

Bu, ABD bor\u00e7 verme mekanizmas\u0131n\u0131n neredeyse \u00fc\u00e7te birinin donduruldu\u011fu ve Haziran 2009’a kadar dondurulmaya devam etti\u011fi anlam\u0131na geliyordu. Brookings Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc’ne g\u00f6re, o zamanlar geleneksel bankac\u0131l\u0131k sistemi bu a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131 kapatacak sermayeye sahip de\u011fildi: “Bu ek bor\u00e7 verme hacmini desteklemek i\u00e7in yeterli sermaye olu\u015fturmak i\u00e7in g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc karlar birka\u00e7 y\u0131l alacakt\u0131r.” Yazarlar ayr\u0131ca, baz\u0131 menkul k\u0131ymetle\u015ftirme bi\u00e7imlerinin “a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 derecede gev\u015fek kredi ko\u015fullar\u0131n\u0131n bir sonucu olarak sonsuza dek yok olma olas\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n” oldu\u011funu belirtiyorlar. Geleneksel bankalar bor\u00e7 verme standartlar\u0131n\u0131 y\u00fckseltirken, bor\u00e7lanma i\u00e7in mevcut fonlardaki azalman\u0131n ba\u015fl\u0131ca nedeni g\u00f6lge bankac\u0131l\u0131k sisteminin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcyd\u00fc.<\/p>\n

G\u00f6lge bankac\u0131l\u0131k sisteminin destekledi\u011fi menkul k\u0131ymetle\u015ftirme piyasalar\u0131 2007 bahar\u0131nda kapanmaya ba\u015flam\u0131\u015f ve 2008 sonbahar\u0131nda neredeyse kapanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. B\u00f6ylelikle \u00f6zel kredi piyasalar\u0131n\u0131n \u00fc\u00e7te birinden fazlas\u0131 fon kayna\u011f\u0131 olarak kullan\u0131lamaz hale geldi. Haziran 2009’da Brookings Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc’ne g\u00f6re, geleneksel bankac\u0131l\u0131k sistemi bu a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131 kapatacak sermayeye sahip de\u011fildi: “Bu ek bor\u00e7 verme hacmini desteklemek i\u00e7in yeterli sermaye \u00fcretmek birka\u00e7 y\u0131l g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc karlar alacakt\u0131” ve baz\u0131 menkul k\u0131ymetle\u015ftirme bi\u00e7imleri “a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 derecede gev\u015fek kredi ko\u015fullar\u0131n\u0131n bir sonucu olarak sonsuza kadar kaybolmas\u0131 muhtemeldir”.<\/p>\n

Emtia Fiyat Enflasyonu<\/h2>\n

Bir\u00e7ok emtia fiyat\u0131ndaki h\u0131zl\u0131 art\u0131\u015flar, konut balonundaki \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fc takip etti. 2008’in sonlar\u0131nda mali krizin etkisini g\u00f6stermeye ba\u015flamas\u0131yla petrol\u00fcn fiyat\u0131 2007’nin ba\u015f\u0131ndan 2008’e kadar 50 dolardan 147 dolara (neredeyse \u00fc\u00e7 kat\u0131na) \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Uzmanlar, baz\u0131lar\u0131 konut ve di\u011fer yat\u0131r\u0131mlardan metalara spek\u00fclatif para ak\u0131\u015f\u0131na, baz\u0131lar\u0131 para politikas\u0131na ve baz\u0131lar\u0131 h\u0131zla b\u00fcy\u00fcyen bir d\u00fcnyada artan hammadde k\u0131tl\u0131\u011f\u0131 hissine atfederek nedenleri tart\u0131\u015f\u0131yor ve bu da uzun pozisyonlar\u0131n al\u0131nmas\u0131na neden oluyor. \u00c7in gibi bu pazarlar Afrika’da artan varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131r\u0131yor. Petrol fiyatlar\u0131ndaki art\u0131\u015f, t\u00fcketici harcamalar\u0131n\u0131n daha b\u00fcy\u00fck bir b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc benzine \u00e7evirme e\u011filimindedir ve bu, petrol ithalat\u00e7\u0131s\u0131 \u00fclkelerde servet petrol \u00fcreten eyaletlere akarken ekonomik b\u00fcy\u00fcme \u00fczerinde a\u015fa\u011f\u0131 y\u00f6nl\u00fc bask\u0131 yarat\u0131r. On y\u0131l boyunca petrol fiyatlar\u0131nda ani bir istikrars\u0131zl\u0131k paterni vard\u0131 ve 2008’in en y\u00fcksek fiyat\u0131na yol a\u00e7t\u0131. Bu fiyat fark\u0131n\u0131n istikrars\u0131zla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131c\u0131 etkileri, finansal krize katk\u0131da bulunan bir fakt\u00f6r olarak \u00f6nerildi.<\/p>\n

Bak\u0131r fiyatlar\u0131 petrol fiyatlar\u0131yla ayn\u0131 zamanda y\u00fckseldi. Bak\u0131r, yakla\u015f\u0131k 1.600 $’a d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc\u011f\u00fc 1990’dan 1999’a kadar ton ba\u015f\u0131na yakla\u015f\u0131k 2.500 $’dan i\u015flem g\u00f6rd\u00fc. Fiyat d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fc, fiyat art\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n bak\u0131r\u0131 2008 y\u0131l\u0131nda ton ba\u015f\u0131na 7.040 $’a \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131\u011f\u0131 2004 y\u0131l\u0131na kadar s\u00fcrd\u00fc.<\/p>\n

\"ABD'de<\/p>\n

Nikel fiyatlar\u0131 1990’lar\u0131n sonunda y\u00fckseldi, ard\u0131ndan May\u0131s 2007’de yakla\u015f\u0131k 51.000 $ \/ 36.700 \u00a3 \/ metrik tondan Ocak 2009’da yakla\u015f\u0131k 11.550 $ \/ 8.300 \u00a3 ‘a d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Fiyatlar ancak Ocak 2010’dan itibaren toparlanmaya ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131, ancak Avustralya’n\u0131n nikel madenlerinin \u00e7o\u011fu o zamana kadar iflas etti. Y\u00fcksek ten\u00f6rl\u00fc nikel s\u00fclfat cevherinin fiyat\u0131 2010 y\u0131l\u0131nda toparlan\u0131rken, Avustralya nikel madencili\u011fi end\u00fcstrisi de y\u00fckseldi. Bu fiyat dalgalanmalar\u0131yla tesad\u00fcfen, yaln\u0131zca uzun vadeli emtia endeksi fonlar\u0131 pop\u00fcler hale geldi -bir tahminle yat\u0131r\u0131m 2006’da 90 milyar dolardan 2007’nin sonunda 200 milyar dolara y\u00fckselirken, emtia fiyatlar\u0131 %71 artt\u0131- bu da bu endeks fonlar\u0131n\u0131n emtia balonuna neden olup olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 konusunda endi\u015feleri art\u0131rd\u0131. Deneysel ara\u015ft\u0131rma kar\u0131\u015f\u0131kt\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Devam\u0131 :
\n2007 \u2013 2008 Finansal Krizi \u2013 4 i\u00e7in t\u0131klay\u0131n
\n<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Yaz\u0131n\u0131n \u00d6nceki B\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fc : 2007 \u2013 2008 Finansal Krizi \u2013 2 i\u00e7in t\u0131klay\u0131n Yanl\u0131\u015f Risk Fiyatland\u0131rmas\u0131 Mortgage riskleri, son 50 y\u0131l\u0131n tarihsel e\u011filimlerinden yola \u00e7\u0131karak konut fiyatlar\u0131n\u0131n d\u00fc\u015fme olas\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 hafife alarak, ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7tan yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131ya kadar olan zincirdeki hemen hemen t\u00fcm kurumlar taraf\u0131ndan k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fcmsenmi\u015ftir.\u00a0 Fiyatland\u0131rma modellerinin kalbi olan temerr\u00fct ve \u00f6n \u00f6deme modellerinin s\u0131n\u0131rlamalar\u0131, ipotek ve varl\u0131\u011fa<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":3665,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,49],"tags":[85,84,82,83],"class_list":{"0":"post-3649","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-jeoekonomik-makro-veriler","8":"category-jeopolitik-risk-analizi","9":"tag-2008-krizi","10":"tag-emlak-balonu","11":"tag-emlak-krizi","12":"tag-mortgage-crisis"},"better_featured_image":{"id":3665,"alt_text":"Menkul k\u0131ymetle\u015ftirme piyasalar\u0131","caption":"Menkul k\u0131ymetle\u015ftirme piyasalar\u0131, Piyasa, 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