{"id":3737,"date":"2022-12-12T23:02:55","date_gmt":"2022-12-12T20:02:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/?p=3737"},"modified":"2025-08-10T13:31:11","modified_gmt":"2025-08-10T10:31:11","slug":"2007-2008-finansal-krizi-5","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/2007-2008-finansal-krizi-5\/","title":{"rendered":"2007 – 2008 Finansal Krizi – 5"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u00d6nceki B\u00f6l\u00fcm<\/strong>
\n2007 \u2013 2008 Finansal Krizi \u2013 4 i\u00e7in t\u0131klay\u0131n<\/a><\/p>\n

G\u00f6lge Bankac\u0131l\u0131k Sisteminin Patlamas\u0131 ve \u00c7\u00f6kmesi<\/h2>\n

En riskli, en k\u00f6t\u00fc performans g\u00f6steren ipoteklerin “g\u00f6lge bankac\u0131l\u0131k sistemi” ile finanse edildi\u011fine ve g\u00f6lge bankac\u0131l\u0131k sisteminden gelen rekabetin, daha geleneksel kurumlara y\u00fcklenim standartlar\u0131n\u0131
\nd\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrmeleri ve daha riskli krediler olu\u015fturmalar\u0131 i\u00e7in bask\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015f olabilece\u011fine dair g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc kan\u0131tlar var.<\/p>\n

New York Federal Rezerv Bankas\u0131 Ba\u015fkan\u0131 ve CEO’su Timothy Geithner -sonras\u0131nda 2009’da ABD Hazine Bakan\u0131 oldu- Haziran 2008’de yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir konu\u015fmada, kredi piyasalar\u0131n\u0131n dondurulmas\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6nemli bir su\u00e7unu, g\u00f6lge bankac\u0131l\u0131k sistemi olarak da adland\u0131r\u0131lan “paralel” bankac\u0131l\u0131k sistemindeki varl\u0131klar \u00fczerinde bir “gidi\u015fatta” su\u00e7lad\u0131. Bu kurulu\u015flar, finansal sistemi destekleyen kredi piyasalar\u0131 i\u00e7in kritik hale geldi, ancak ayn\u0131 d\u00fczenleyici kontrollere tabi de\u011fillerdi. Ayr\u0131ca, bu varl\u0131klar Varl\u0131k-y\u00fck\u00fcml\u00fcl\u00fck uyumsuzlu\u011fundan dolay\u0131 savunmas\u0131zd\u0131, bu da uzun vadeli, likit olmayan ve riskli varl\u0131klar\u0131 sat\u0131n almak i\u00e7in likit piyasalardan k\u0131sa vadeli bor\u00e7 ald\u0131klar\u0131 anlam\u0131na geliyordu. Bu, kredi piyasalar\u0131ndaki aksakl\u0131klar\u0131n, onlar\u0131, uzun vadeli varl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck fiyatlardan satarak, h\u0131zl\u0131 bir \u015fekilde kald\u0131ra\u00e7 kald\u0131rmaya zorlayaca\u011f\u0131 anlam\u0131na geliyordu. Bu varl\u0131klar\u0131n \u00f6nemini \u015f\u00f6yle anlatt\u0131:<\/p>\n

2007’nin ba\u015flar\u0131nda, yap\u0131land\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015f yat\u0131r\u0131m ara\u00e7lar\u0131nda<\/a>, a\u00e7\u0131k art\u0131rma oranl\u0131 tercihli menkul k\u0131ymetlerde, ihale opsiyonlu tahvillerde ve de\u011fi\u015fken faizli vadesiz senetlerde varl\u0131\u011fa dayal\u0131 ticari k\u00e2\u011f\u0131t kanallar\u0131, kabaca 2,2 trilyon dolarl\u0131k bir toplam varl\u0131k b\u00fcy\u00fckl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcne sahipti. \u00dc\u00e7 partili repo ile bir gecede finanse edilen varl\u0131klar 2,5 trilyon dolara \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Hedge fonlarda tutulan varl\u0131klar kabaca 1.8 trilyon dolara \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. En b\u00fcy\u00fck be\u015f yat\u0131r\u0131m bankas\u0131n\u0131n birle\u015fik bilan\u00e7olar\u0131 4 trilyon dolar\u0131 buldu. Kar\u015f\u0131la\u015ft\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, Amerika Birle\u015fik Devletleri’ndeki en b\u00fcy\u00fck be\u015f banka holding \u015firketinin toplam varl\u0131klar\u0131 o noktada 6 trilyon dolar\u0131n biraz \u00fczerindeydi ve t\u00fcm bankac\u0131l\u0131k sisteminin toplam varl\u0131klar\u0131 yakla\u015f\u0131k 10 trilyon dolard\u0131. Bu fakt\u00f6rlerin birle\u015fik etkisi, kendi kendini g\u00fc\u00e7lendiren varl\u0131k fiyat\u0131 ve kredi d\u00f6ng\u00fclerine kar\u015f\u0131 savunmas\u0131z bir finansal sistemdi.<\/p>\n

Ekonomi Bilimleri Nobel Anma \u00d6d\u00fcl\u00fc sahibi ekonomist Paul Krugman, g\u00f6lge bankac\u0131l\u0131k sistemindeki ko\u015fuyu krize neden olan “olanlar\u0131n \u00f6z\u00fc” olarak nitelendirdi. Bu kontrol eksikli\u011finden “k\u00f6t\u00fc niyetli ihmal” olarak bahsetti ve d\u00fczenlemenin t\u00fcm bankac\u0131l\u0131k benzeri faaliyetlere empoze edilmesi gerekti\u011fini savundu. \u00c7o\u011fu ipote\u011fe dayal\u0131 menkul k\u0131ymetler veya varl\u0131\u011fa dayal\u0131 ticari senetler kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131nda yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131 fonlar\u0131 elde etme yetene\u011fi olmadan, yat\u0131r\u0131m bankalar\u0131 ve g\u00f6lge bankac\u0131l\u0131k sistemindeki di\u011fer varl\u0131klar ipotek firmalar\u0131na ve di\u011fer \u015firketlere fon sa\u011flayamazlard\u0131.<\/p>\n

Bu, ABD bor\u00e7 verme mekanizmas\u0131n\u0131n neredeyse \u00fc\u00e7te birinin donduruldu\u011fu ve Haziran 2009’a kadar dondurulmaya devam etti\u011fi anlam\u0131na geliyordu. Brookings Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc’ne g\u00f6re, o zamanlar geleneksel bankac\u0131l\u0131k sistemi bu a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131 kapatacak sermayeye sahip de\u011fildi: “Bu ek bor\u00e7 verme hacmini desteklemek i\u00e7in yeterli sermaye olu\u015fturmak i\u00e7in g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc karlar birka\u00e7 y\u0131l alacakt\u0131r.” Yazarlar ayr\u0131ca, baz\u0131 menkul k\u0131ymetle\u015ftirme bi\u00e7imlerinin “a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 derecede gev\u015fek kredi ko\u015fullar\u0131n\u0131n bir sonucu olarak sonsuza dek yok olma olas\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n” oldu\u011funu belirtiyorlar. Geleneksel bankalar bor\u00e7 verme standartlar\u0131n\u0131 y\u00fckseltirken, bor\u00e7lanma i\u00e7in mevcut fonlardaki azalman\u0131n ba\u015fl\u0131ca nedeni g\u00f6lge bankac\u0131l\u0131k sisteminin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcyd\u00fc.<\/p>\n

G\u00f6lge bankac\u0131l\u0131k sisteminin destekledi\u011fi menkul k\u0131ymetle\u015ftirme piyasalar\u0131 2007 bahar\u0131nda kapanmaya ba\u015flam\u0131\u015f ve 2008 sonbahar\u0131nda neredeyse kapanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. B\u00f6ylelikle \u00f6zel kredi piyasalar\u0131n\u0131n \u00fc\u00e7te birinden fazlas\u0131 fon kayna\u011f\u0131 olarak kullan\u0131lamaz hale geldi. Haziran 2009’da Brookings Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc’ne g\u00f6re, geleneksel bankac\u0131l\u0131k sistemi bu a\u00e7\u0131\u011f\u0131 kapatacak sermayeye sahip de\u011fildi: “Bu ek bor\u00e7 verme hacmini desteklemek i\u00e7in yeterli sermaye \u00fcretmek birka\u00e7 y\u0131l g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc karlar alacakt\u0131” ve baz\u0131 menkul k\u0131ymetle\u015ftirme bi\u00e7imleri “a\u015f\u0131r\u0131 derecede gev\u015fek kredi ko\u015fullar\u0131n\u0131n bir sonucu olarak sonsuza kadar kaybolmas\u0131 muhtemeldir”.<\/p>\n

Emtia Fiyat Enflasyonu<\/h2>\n

Bir\u00e7ok emtia fiyat\u0131ndaki h\u0131zl\u0131 art\u0131\u015flar, konut balonundaki \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fc takip etti. 2008’in sonlar\u0131nda mali krizin etkisini g\u00f6stermeye ba\u015flamas\u0131yla petrol\u00fcn fiyat\u0131 2007’nin ba\u015f\u0131ndan 2008’e kadar 50 dolardan 147 dolara (neredeyse \u00fc\u00e7 kat\u0131na) \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Uzmanlar, baz\u0131lar\u0131 konut ve di\u011fer yat\u0131r\u0131mlardan metalara spek\u00fclatif para ak\u0131\u015f\u0131na, baz\u0131lar\u0131 para politikas\u0131na ve baz\u0131lar\u0131 h\u0131zla b\u00fcy\u00fcyen bir d\u00fcnyada artan hammadde k\u0131tl\u0131\u011f\u0131 hissine atfederek nedenleri tart\u0131\u015f\u0131yor ve bu da uzun pozisyonlar\u0131n al\u0131nmas\u0131na neden oluyor. \u00c7in gibi bu pazarlar Afrika’da artan varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131r\u0131yor. Petrol fiyatlar\u0131ndaki art\u0131\u015f, t\u00fcketici harcamalar\u0131n\u0131n daha b\u00fcy\u00fck bir b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc benzine \u00e7evirme e\u011filimindedir ve bu, petrol ithalat\u00e7\u0131s\u0131 \u00fclkelerde servet petrol \u00fcreten eyaletlere akarken ekonomik b\u00fcy\u00fcme \u00fczerinde a\u015fa\u011f\u0131 y\u00f6nl\u00fc bask\u0131 yarat\u0131r. On y\u0131l boyunca petrol fiyatlar\u0131nda ani bir istikrars\u0131zl\u0131k paterni vard\u0131 ve 2008’in en y\u00fcksek fiyat\u0131na yol a\u00e7t\u0131. Bu fiyat fark\u0131n\u0131n istikrars\u0131zla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131c\u0131 etkileri, finansal krize katk\u0131da bulunan bir fakt\u00f6r olarak \u00f6nerildi.<\/p>\n

Bak\u0131r fiyatlar\u0131 petrol fiyatlar\u0131yla ayn\u0131 zamanda y\u00fckseldi. Bak\u0131r, yakla\u015f\u0131k 1.600 $’a d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc\u011f\u00fc 1990’dan 1999’a kadar ton ba\u015f\u0131na yakla\u015f\u0131k 2.500 $’dan i\u015flem g\u00f6rd\u00fc. Fiyat d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fc, fiyat art\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n bak\u0131r\u0131 2008 y\u0131l\u0131nda ton ba\u015f\u0131na 7.040 $’a \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131\u011f\u0131 2004 y\u0131l\u0131na kadar s\u00fcrd\u00fc.<\/p>\n

\"K\u00fcresel
K\u00fcresel Bak\u0131r Fiyatlar\u0131<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Nikel fiyatlar\u0131 1990’lar\u0131n sonunda y\u00fckseldi, ard\u0131ndan May\u0131s 2007’de yakla\u015f\u0131k 51.000 $ \/ 36.700 \u00a3 \/ metrik tondan Ocak 2009’da yakla\u015f\u0131k 11.550 $ \/ 8.300 \u00a3 ‘a d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Fiyatlar ancak Ocak 2010’dan itibaren toparlanmaya ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131, ancak Avustralya’n\u0131n nikel madenlerinin \u00e7o\u011fu o zamana kadar iflas etti. Y\u00fcksek ten\u00f6rl\u00fc nikel s\u00fclfat cevherinin fiyat\u0131 2010 y\u0131l\u0131nda toparlan\u0131rken, Avustralya nikel madencili\u011fi end\u00fcstrisi de y\u00fckseldi. Bu fiyat dalgalanmalar\u0131yla tesad\u00fcfen, yaln\u0131zca uzun vadeli emtia endeksi fonlar\u0131 pop\u00fcler hale geldi -bir tahminle yat\u0131r\u0131m 2006’da 90 milyar dolardan 2007’nin sonunda 200 milyar dolara y\u00fckselirken, emtia fiyatlar\u0131 %71 artt\u0131- bu da bu endeks fonlar\u0131n\u0131n emtia balonuna neden olup olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 konusunda endi\u015feleri art\u0131rd\u0131. Deneysel ara\u015ft\u0131rma kar\u0131\u015f\u0131kt\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Kapitalizmin Sistemik Krizi<\/h2>\n

1998 tarihli bir kitapta John McMurtry, bir finansal krizin kapitalizmin kendisinin sistemik bir krizi oldu\u011funu \u00f6ne s\u00fcrd\u00fc.<\/p>\n

Ravi Batra, 1978 tarihli The Downfall of Capitalism and Communism adl\u0131 kitab\u0131nda, finansal kapitalizmin artan e\u015fitsizli\u011finin patlayan ve depresyon ve b\u00fcy\u00fck siyasi de\u011fi\u015fikliklerle sonu\u00e7lanan spek\u00fclatif balonlar \u00fcretti\u011fini \u00f6ne s\u00fcr\u00fcyor. Ayr\u0131ca, farkl\u0131 \u00fccret ve verimlilik art\u0131\u015f\u0131yla ilgili bir “talep bo\u015flu\u011funun” borsa geli\u015fmeleri i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli olan a\u00e7\u0131k ve bor\u00e7 dinamiklerini a\u00e7\u0131klad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6ne s\u00fcrd\u00fc.<\/p>\n

Politik ekonomi analisti ve Monthly Review edit\u00f6r\u00fc John Bellamy Foster, 1970’lerin ba\u015f\u0131ndan bu yana GSY\u0130H b\u00fcy\u00fcme oranlar\u0131ndaki d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn, artan piyasa doygunlu\u011fundan kaynakland\u0131\u011f\u0131na inan\u0131yordu.<\/p>\n

Marksist ekonomi takip\u00e7ileri Andrew Kliman, Michael Roberts ve Guglielmo Carchedi, Foster taraf\u0131ndan temsil edilen Monthly Review okulunun tersine, kapitalizmin uzun vadeli k\u00e2r oran\u0131n\u0131n d\u00fc\u015fme e\u011filimine genel olarak krizlerin alt\u0131nda yatan neden oldu\u011funa i\u015faret ettiler. Bu bak\u0131\u015f a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan, sorun, sermayenin yaln\u0131zca \u00fcretken yat\u0131r\u0131m yoluyla yeterli oranlarda b\u00fcy\u00fcyememesi veya birikememesiydi. \u00dcretken sekt\u00f6rlerdeki d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck kar oranlar\u0131, daha fazla yat\u0131r\u0131m getirisi potansiyeli olan riskli varl\u0131klara spek\u00fclatif yat\u0131r\u0131m yap\u0131lmas\u0131na yol a\u00e7t\u0131. 90’lar\u0131n sonundaki ve 2000’lerin spek\u00fclatif \u00e7\u0131lg\u0131nl\u0131\u011f\u0131, bu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fe g\u00f6re, k\u00e2r oran\u0131ndaki d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015fle ifade edilen, artan organik sermaye bile\u015fiminin bir sonucuydu. Michael Roberts’a g\u00f6re, k\u00e2r oran\u0131ndaki d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f “sonunda, kredinin art\u0131k k\u00e2r\u0131 destekleyemedi\u011fi 2007’deki kredi s\u0131k\u0131\u015f\u0131kl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 tetikledi”.<\/p>\n

2005 tarihli The Battle for the Soul of Capitalism kitab\u0131nda John C. Bogle, “Kurumsal Amerika, b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde y\u00f6neticilerin g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fcn \u00e7ok uzun s\u00fcre bek\u00e7ilerimiz taraf\u0131ndan neredeyse hi\u00e7 kontrol edilmedi\u011fi i\u00e7in yoldan \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131” yazd\u0131. James Burnham’\u0131n 1941 tarihli ufuk a\u00e7\u0131c\u0131 kitab\u0131 The Managerial Revolution’\u0131n ana tezini yineleyen Bogle, a\u015fa\u011f\u0131dakileri i\u00e7eren konular\u0131 aktar\u0131yor:<\/p>\n

\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 “Y\u00f6netici kapitalizmi” nin “sahip kapitalizminin”<\/a> yerini ald\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131, yani y\u00f6netimin firmay\u0131 hissedarlar yerine kendi menfaati i\u00e7in i\u015fletti\u011fi, bu da as\u0131l-vekil sorununun bir varyasyonu oldu\u011fu anlam\u0131na gelir;<\/p>\n

\u00b7\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u0130svi\u00e7re merkezli UBS Bank’ta eski bir y\u00f6netici olan Mark Roeder, The Big Mo adl\u0131 kitab\u0131nda, finansal krizde b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7ekli ivmenin veya The Big Mo’nun “\u00e7ok \u00f6nemli bir rol oynad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131” \u00f6ne s\u00fcrd\u00fc. Roeder, “bilgisayar destekli ticaret programlar\u0131 gibi son teknolojik geli\u015fmelerin, piyasalar\u0131n giderek artan bir \u015fekilde birbirine ba\u011fl\u0131 do\u011fas\u0131 ile birlikte, momentum etkisini art\u0131rd\u0131. Bunun, finans sekt\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fc do\u011fas\u0131 gere\u011fi istikrars\u0131z hale getirdi\u011fini” \u00f6ne s\u00fcrd\u00fc.<\/p>\n

Robert Reich, ekonomik gerilemeyi Amerika Birle\u015fik Devletleri’ndeki \u00fccretlerdeki, \u00f6zellikle de i\u015fg\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fcn %80’ini olu\u015fturan saatlik i\u015f\u00e7ilerin durgunlu\u011funa ba\u011flad\u0131. Bu durgunluk, n\u00fcfusu ge\u00e7im masraflar\u0131n\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131lamak i\u00e7in bor\u00e7lanmaya zorlad\u0131.<\/p>\n

Ekonomistler Ailsa McKay ve Margunn Bj\u00f8rnholt, finansal krizin ve buna yan\u0131t\u0131n ana ak\u0131m iktisatta ve iktisat mesle\u011finde bir fikir krizini ortaya \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve hem ekonominin hem iktisat teorisinin hem de iktisat mesle\u011finin yeniden \u015fekillenmesi \u00e7a\u011fr\u0131s\u0131nda bulundular.<\/p>\n

Yanl\u0131\u015f Bankac\u0131l\u0131k Modeli: Kredi Birliklerinin Dayan\u0131kl\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131<\/h2>\n

Uluslararas\u0131 \u00c7al\u0131\u015fma \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc’n\u00fcn bir raporu, kooperatif bankac\u0131l\u0131k kurumlar\u0131n\u0131n kriz s\u0131ras\u0131nda rakiplerinden daha az ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z oldu\u011fu sonucuna vard\u0131. Kooperatif bankac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 sekt\u00f6r\u00fc, Avrupa bankac\u0131l\u0131k sekt\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcn %20 pazar pay\u0131na sahipti, ancak 2007’nin \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc \u00e7eyre\u011fi ile 2011’in ilk \u00e7eyre\u011fi aras\u0131ndaki t\u00fcm d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f ve kay\u0131plar\u0131n yaln\u0131zca %7’sini olu\u015fturdu. 2008’de ABD’de ticari banka ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n oran\u0131 kredi birliklerindekinin neredeyse \u00fc\u00e7 kat\u0131 ve 2010’daki kredi birli\u011fi oran\u0131n\u0131n neredeyse be\u015f kat\u0131yd\u0131. Kredi birlikleri k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck ve orta \u00f6l\u00e7ekli i\u015fletmelere verdikleri kredileri art\u0131r\u0131rken, bu i\u015fletmelere verilen genel krediler azald\u0131.<\/p>\n

Krizi \u00d6ng\u00f6ren Ekonomistler<\/h2>\n

Ekonomistler, \u00f6zellikle de ana ak\u0131m ekonominin takip\u00e7ileri, krizi \u00e7o\u011funlukla tahmin edemediler. Pennsylvania \u00dcniversitesi’nden Wharton Okulu’nun \u00e7evrimi\u00e7i i\u015f dergisi, ekonomistlerin neden b\u00fcy\u00fck bir k\u00fcresel mali krizi tahmin edemediklerini incelemi\u015f ve ekonomistlerin, \u00fcreticiler, mal ve hizmetlerin t\u00fcketicileri yerine bankalar\u0131n ve di\u011fer finans kurumlar\u0131n\u0131n ekonomide oynad\u0131\u011f\u0131 kritik rollerini hesaba katmakta ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olan matematiksel modeller kulland\u0131klar\u0131 sonucuna varm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n

Kitle ileti\u015fim ara\u00e7lar\u0131nda yay\u0131nlanan pop\u00fcler makaleler, genel halk\u0131n, iktisat\u00e7\u0131lar\u0131n \u00e7o\u011funlu\u011funun mali krizi tahmin etme y\u00fck\u00fcml\u00fcl\u00fcklerinde ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olduklar\u0131na inanmas\u0131na yol a\u00e7t\u0131. \u00d6rne\u011fin, The New York Times’daki bir makale, ekonomist Nouriel Roubini’nin Eyl\u00fcl 2006 gibi erken bir tarihte bu t\u00fcr krizler konusunda uyard\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve iktisat mesle\u011finin durgunluklar\u0131 tahmin etmede k\u00f6t\u00fc oldu\u011funu belirtti. The Guardian’a g\u00f6re, Roubini konut piyasas\u0131nda bir \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f ve d\u00fcnya \u00e7ap\u0131nda durgunluk \u00f6ng\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc i\u00e7in alay konusu olurken, The New York Times onu “Dr. Doom” olarak etiketledi.<\/p>\n

Ana ak\u0131m finansal ekonomide, \u00e7o\u011fu ki\u015fi Eugene Fama’n\u0131n verimli piyasa hipotezini ve ilgili rastgele y\u00fcr\u00fcy\u00fc\u015f hipotezini takiben, -s\u0131ras\u0131yla piyasalar\u0131n gelecekteki olas\u0131 hareketler hakk\u0131nda t\u00fcm bilgileri i\u00e7erdi\u011fini ve finansal fiyat hareketlerinin rastgele ve \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fclemez oldu\u011funu belirtir- finansal krizlerin basit\u00e7e tahmin edilemez oldu\u011funa inan\u0131yor. Son zamanlarda yap\u0131lan ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar, potansiyel krizlerin “erken uyar\u0131” sistemlerinin do\u011frulu\u011fu konusunda \u015f\u00fcphe uyand\u0131r\u0131yor, ki bunlar\u0131n zamanlamalar\u0131n\u0131 da tahmin etmesi gerekiyor.<\/p>\n

Avusturya Okulu krizi, parasal arzdaki gev\u015fekli\u011fin neden oldu\u011fu \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fclebilir kredi kaynakl\u0131 baloncu\u011fun bir temeli ve klasik bir \u00f6rne\u011fi olarak g\u00f6rd\u00fc.<\/p>\n

Heterodoks ekonominin birka\u00e7 takip\u00e7isi, krizi \u00e7e\u015fitli arg\u00fcmanlarla \u00f6ng\u00f6rd\u00fc. Dirk Bezemer, krizi tahmin eden 12 iktisat\u00e7\u0131ya kredi veriyor: Dean Baker (ABD), Wynne Godley (\u0130ngiltere), Fred Harrison (\u0130ngiltere), Michael Hudson (ABD), Eric Janszen (ABD), Steve Keen (Avustralya), Jakob Broechner Madsen & Jens Kjaer S\u00f8rensen (Danimarka), Med Jones ( ABD) [369] Kurt Richeb\u00e4cher (ABD), Nouriel Roubini (ABD), Peter Schiff (ABD) ve Robert Shiller (ABD).<\/p>\n

Konut fiyatlar\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6l\u00e7en Case-Shiller endeksinin kurucular\u0131ndan Shiller, Lehman Brothers’\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnden bir y\u0131l \u00f6nce, yava\u015flayan bir ABD konut piyasas\u0131n\u0131n konut balonunun patlamas\u0131na ve finansal \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015fe yol a\u00e7aca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 tahmin etti\u011fi bir makale yazd\u0131. Schiff, krizden \u00f6nceki y\u0131llarda d\u00fczenli olarak televizyona \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131 ve yakla\u015fan gayrimenkul \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fc konusunda uyard\u0131.<\/p>\n

Karim Abadir, Gabriel Talmain ile yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmadan yola \u00e7\u0131karak, tetikleyicisi 2007’nin ba\u015flar\u0131ndan itibaren reel ekonomide kendini g\u00f6stermeye ba\u015flayan durgunlu\u011fun zamanlamas\u0131n\u0131 tahmin etti.<\/p>\n

Bekleyen bir kriz konusunda uyar\u0131da bulunan ba\u015fka iktisat\u00e7\u0131lar da vard\u0131.<\/p>\n

Hindistan Merkez Bankas\u0131 eski Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Raghuram Rajan, 2005 y\u0131l\u0131nda Uluslararas\u0131 Para Fonu’nda ba\u015f ekonomist oldu\u011funda krizi tahmin etmi\u015fti. 2005 y\u0131l\u0131nda, ABD Merkez Bankas\u0131 ba\u015fkan\u0131 olarak emekli olmak \u00fczere olan Alan Greenspan’\u0131 onurland\u0131ran bir kutlamada Rajan, finans sekt\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fc ele\u015ftiren tart\u0131\u015fmal\u0131 bir makale sundu. O yaz\u0131da Rajan “felaketin ba\u015f g\u00f6sterebilece\u011fini” savundu. Rajan, finans sekt\u00f6r\u00fc y\u00f6neticilerinin \u201c\u2018k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck olas\u0131l\u0131kla ciddi olumsuz sonu\u00e7lar yaratan riskler almalar\u0131 i\u00e7in te\u015fvik edildi\u011fini, ancak kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131nda geri kalan zamanlarda c\u00f6mert tazminat teklif ettiklerini\u2019 savundu. Bu riskler, kuyruk riskleri olarak bilinir. Ancak belki de en \u00f6nemlisi endi\u015fe olu\u015fturup olu\u015fturmad\u0131\u011f\u0131d\u0131r. Bankalar, finansal piyasalara likidite sa\u011flayabilecekler, b\u00f6ylece kuyruk riski ger\u00e7ekle\u015firse, finansal pozisyonlar \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclebilir ve kay\u0131plar tahsis edilebilir, b\u00f6ylelikle reel ekonomi \u00fczerindeki sonu\u00e7lar en aza indirilir.”<\/p>\n

2007 tarihli The Black Swan kitab\u0131n\u0131n yazar\u0131 olan borsa t\u00fcccar\u0131 ve finansal risk m\u00fchendisi Nassim Nicholas Taleb, k\u00f6t\u00fc risk modellerini kullanmalar\u0131 ve bunlara g\u00fcvenmeleri ve bunlara g\u00fcvenmeleri nedeniyle \u00f6zellikle bankac\u0131l\u0131k sisteminin ve genel olarak ekonominin \u00e7\u00f6kmesine kar\u015f\u0131 y\u0131llarca uyar\u0131da bulundu ve sorunu “sa\u011flaml\u0131k ve k\u0131r\u0131lganl\u0131\u011f\u0131n” bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olarak \u00e7er\u00e7eveledi. Bankac\u0131l\u0131k hisselerine b\u00fcy\u00fck bir finansal bahis yaparak ve krizden bir servet kazanarak kurulu\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fcne kar\u015f\u0131 da harekete ge\u00e7ti (“Dinlemediler, ben de paralar\u0131n\u0131 ald\u0131m”).<\/p>\n

The New York Times’tan David Brooks’a g\u00f6re, “Taleb sadece neler oldu\u011funa dair bir a\u00e7\u0131klama yapmakla kalmad\u0131, bunun olaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 da g\u00f6rd\u00fc.”<\/p>\n

IndyMac<\/h2>\n

Amerika Birle\u015fik Devletleri’nde sorun ya\u015fayan ilk g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcr kurum, Countrywide Financial’\u0131n bir yan \u00fcr\u00fcn\u00fc olan G\u00fcney Kaliforniya merkezli IndyMac idi. IndyMac Bank, ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan \u00f6nce Los Angeles pazar\u0131ndaki en b\u00fcy\u00fck tasarruf ve kredi birli\u011fi ve Amerika Birle\u015fik Devletleri’ndeki en b\u00fcy\u00fck yedinci mortgage kredisi yarat\u0131c\u0131s\u0131yd\u0131. IndyMac Bank’\u0131n 11 Temmuz 2008’deki ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131, kriz daha da b\u00fcy\u00fck ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131klar\u0131 h\u0131zland\u0131rana kadar Amerika Birle\u015fik Devletleri tarihindeki en b\u00fcy\u00fck d\u00f6rd\u00fcnc\u00fc banka ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve d\u00fczenlenmi\u015f tasarrufun ikinci en b\u00fcy\u00fck ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131yd\u0131. IndyMac Bank’\u0131n ana \u015firketi, FDIC IndyMac Bank’\u0131 ele ge\u00e7irene kadar IndyMac Bancorp’tu. IndyMac Bancorp, Temmuz 2008’de B\u00f6l\u00fcm 7 iflas ba\u015fvurusunda bulundu.<\/p>\n

IndyMac Bank, Countrywide Mortgage Yat\u0131r\u0131m\u0131 olarak 1985 y\u0131l\u0131nda David S. Loeb ve Angelo Mozilo taraf\u0131ndan, Freddie Mac ve Fannie Mae’ye sat\u0131lamayacak kadar b\u00fcy\u00fck olan Countrywide Finans kredilerini teminatland\u0131rma arac\u0131 olarak kuruldu. 1997’de Countrywide, IndyMac’ten, Temmuz 2008’de bankan\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcne kadar CEO’su olarak kalan Mike Perry taraf\u0131ndan y\u00f6netilen ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z bir \u015firket olarak ayr\u0131ld\u0131.<\/p>\n

Ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n ba\u015fl\u0131ca nedenleri, b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde Alt-A kredileri yaratma ve b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7ekte menkul k\u0131ymetle\u015ftirme i\u015f stratejisiyle ili\u015fkiliydi. Bu strateji, h\u0131zl\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fcme ve y\u00fcksek oranda riskli varl\u0131klarla sonu\u00e7land\u0131. IndyMac, 2000 y\u0131l\u0131nda bir tasarruf birli\u011fi olarak ba\u015flang\u0131c\u0131ndan bu yana, Amerika Birle\u015fik Devletleri’nde yedinci en b\u00fcy\u00fck tasarruf ve kredi ve dokuzuncu en b\u00fcy\u00fck ipotek kredisi yarat\u0131c\u0131s\u0131 oldu. 2006 y\u0131l\u0131nda, IndyMac 90 milyar dolar\u0131n \u00fczerinde ipotek yaratt\u0131.<\/p>\n

IndyMac’in agresif b\u00fcy\u00fcme stratejisi, Alt-A ve di\u011fer geleneksel olmayan kredi \u00fcr\u00fcnlerinin kullan\u0131m\u0131, yetersiz y\u00fcklenim, konut balonunun en belirgin oldu\u011fu Nevada ve Arizona eyaletlerinin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra Kaliforniya ve Florida pazarlar\u0131ndaki konut ama\u00e7l\u0131 gayrimenkullerde kredi yo\u011funla\u015fmalar\u0131 ve a\u011f\u0131r g\u00fcven Federal Konut Kredisi Bankas\u0131’ndan (FHLB) ve arac\u0131l\u0131k edilen mevduatlardan al\u0131nan maliyetli fonlar, mortgage piyasas\u0131 2007’de d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc\u011f\u00fcnde \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcne yol a\u00e7t\u0131.<\/p>\n

IndyMac genellikle bor\u00e7lunun gelirini veya varl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 do\u011frulamadan ve zay\u0131f kredi ge\u00e7mi\u015fine sahip bor\u00e7lulara krediler veriyordu. IndyMac taraf\u0131ndan temel teminat \u00fczerine elde edilen de\u011ferlendirmeler de genellikle sorgulanabilirdi. Bir Alt-A kredisi veren olarak IndyMac’in i\u015f modeli, \u00e7ok \u00e7e\u015fitli riskli opsiyon ayarl\u0131 oranl\u0131 ipotekleri (opsiyonlu ARM’ler), y\u00fcksek riskli kredileri, 80\/20 kredileri ve di\u011fer geleneksel olmayan \u00fcr\u00fcnleri kullanarak bor\u00e7lunun ihtiya\u00e7lar\u0131na uygun kredi \u00fcr\u00fcnleri sunmakt\u0131. Nihayetinde, \u00f6demelerini yapamayan bir\u00e7ok bor\u00e7luya bor\u00e7 verildi. Tasarruf, yaln\u0131zca bu kredileri ikincil ipotek piyasas\u0131nda satabildi\u011fi s\u00fcrece k\u00e2rl\u0131 kald\u0131. IndyMac, bu kredilere kat\u0131l\u0131m\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fczenleme veya ihra\u00e7 kriterlerini s\u0131k\u0131la\u015ft\u0131rma \u00e7abalar\u0131na direndi: Ba\u015f Risk Sorumlusu Ruthann Melbourne\u2019un, d\u00fczenleyici kurumlara yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamaya bak\u0131n.<\/p>\n

12 May\u0131s 2008’de, son 10 \u00e7eyre\u011finde “Sermaye” b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcnde, IndyMac gelecekte iyi bir \u015fekilde sermaye bulamayabilece\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klad\u0131.<\/p>\n

IndyMac, Nisan 2008’de Moody’s ve Standard & Poor’s<\/a>‘un, IndyMac taraf\u0131ndan ihra\u00e7 edilen ve bankan\u0131n MBS portf\u00f6y\u00fcnde tuttu\u011fu 160 milyon $’\u0131 da i\u00e7eren \u00f6nemli say\u0131da mortgage destekli menkul k\u0131ymet (MBS) tahvilinin notunu indirdi\u011fini bildirdi. IndyMac, bu indirmelerin 30 Haziran 2008 itibariyle riske dayal\u0131 sermaye oran\u0131na zarar verece\u011fi sonucuna vard\u0131. Bu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fclm\u00fc\u015f derecelendirmeler 31 Mart 2008’de ge\u00e7erli olsayd\u0131, IndyMac, bankan\u0131n sermaye oran\u0131n\u0131n toplam %9,27 risk bazl\u0131 olaca\u011f\u0131 sonucuna vard\u0131. IndyMac, reg\u00fclat\u00f6rleri sermaye pozisyonunun “olduk\u00e7a iyi kapitalize edilmi\u015f” (minimum %10 risk bazl\u0131 sermaye oran\u0131) seviyesinde, “yeterince kapitalize edilmi\u015f” (%8-10 risk bazl\u0131 sermaye oran\u0131) seviyesi alt\u0131na d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc tespit ederse, bankan\u0131n art\u0131k arac\u0131l\u0131k edilen mevduatlar\u0131 bir fon kayna\u011f\u0131 olarak kullanabilir olmayabilece\u011fi konusunda uyard\u0131.<\/p>\n

Senat\u00f6r Charles Schumer (D-NY) daha sonra, arac\u0131l\u0131k edilen mevduat\u0131n IndyMac’in toplam mevduat\u0131n\u0131n %37’sinden fazlas\u0131n\u0131 olu\u015fturdu\u011funa i\u015faret etti ve Federal Mevduat Sigorta \u015eirketi’ne (FDIC) IndyMac’e bu mevduata olan ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 azaltmas\u0131 i\u00e7in komut vermeyi d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcp d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmedi\u011fini sordu. 31 Mart’ta bildirilen toplam mevduat\u0131n 18.9 milyar dolar olmas\u0131yla Senat\u00f6r Schumer, arac\u0131l\u0131 mevduata 7 milyar dolardan biraz fazla at\u0131fta bulunuyordu. Bu mevduatlar\u0131n vadelerinin k\u0131r\u0131l\u0131m\u0131 tam olarak bilinmemekle birlikte, reg\u00fclat\u00f6r IndyMac’in 30 Haziran’da yeni arac\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 mevduat edinmesine izin vermemi\u015f olsayd\u0131, basit bir ortalama, IndyMac’e arac\u0131l\u0131k edilen mevduat kayb\u0131 tehdidini ayda 500 milyon dolara \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131rd\u0131.<\/p>\n

IndyMac, baz\u0131 tercih edilen menkul k\u0131ymetlerin faiz \u00f6demelerini ertelemek gibi sermayeyi korumak i\u00e7in yeni \u00f6nlemler al\u0131yordu. Adi hisseler \u00fczerindeki temett\u00fcler, \u00f6nceki \u00e7eyre\u011fin yar\u0131s\u0131nda kesildikten sonra 2008’in ilk \u00e7eyre\u011fi i\u00e7in zaten ask\u0131ya al\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. \u015eirket h\u00e2l\u00e2 \u00f6nemli bir sermaye ak\u0131\u015f\u0131 sa\u011flam\u0131\u015f ya da haz\u0131r bir al\u0131c\u0131 bulamam\u0131\u015ft\u0131.<\/p>\n

IndyMac, bankan\u0131n riske dayal\u0131 sermayesinin bu %10’luk i\u015faret i\u00e7in gereken minimumun yaln\u0131zca 47 milyon $ \u00fczerinde oldu\u011funu bildirdi. Ancak 31 Mart 2008 itibariyle sahip oldu\u011funu iddia etti\u011fi 47 milyon dolarl\u0131k sermayenin bir k\u0131sm\u0131n\u0131n uydurma oldu\u011funu ortaya \u00e7\u0131karmad\u0131.<\/p>\n

2007’nin ikinci yar\u0131s\u0131nda konut fiyatlar\u0131 d\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc\u011f\u00fcnde ve ikincil ipotek piyasas\u0131 \u00e7\u00f6kt\u00fc\u011f\u00fcnde, IndyMac ikincil piyasada satamayaca\u011f\u0131 10,7 milyar dolarl\u0131k krediyi elinde tutmak zorunda kald\u0131. Azalan likidite, hesap sahiplerinin 1.55 milyar $ veya IndyMac’in mevduatlar\u0131n\u0131n yakla\u015f\u0131k %7.5’ini \u00e7ekmesiyle 2008 Haziran ay\u0131 sonlar\u0131nda daha da \u015fiddetlendi. Tasarrufla u\u011fra\u015fan bu banka, Senat\u00f6r Charles Schumer’\u0131n FDIC ve OTS’ye g\u00f6nderdi\u011fi bir mektubun kamuoyuna a\u00e7\u0131klanmas\u0131n\u0131n ard\u0131ndan geldi. Mektup, Senat\u00f6r\u00fcn IndyMac ile olan endi\u015felerini \u00f6zetledi. \u00c7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131rma, IndyMac’in \u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fcn zamanlamas\u0131na katk\u0131da bulunan bir fakt\u00f6r olsa da, ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n alt\u0131nda yatan neden, \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00fcvenli olmayan ve sa\u011flam olmayan yoldu. 26 Haziran 2008’de Senato Bankac\u0131l\u0131k Komitesi \u00fcyesi, Kongre Ortak Tasarrufk Komitesi ba\u015fkan\u0131 ve Senato’da \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc s\u0131rada yer alan Demokrat Senat\u00f6r Charles Schumer (D-NY), d\u00fczenleyicilere g\u00f6nderdi\u011fi birka\u00e7 mektubu yay\u0131nlad\u0131. “IndyMac’in mali k\u00f6t\u00fcle\u015fmesinin hem vergi m\u00fckellefleri hem de bor\u00e7lular i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli riskler olu\u015fturdu\u011fundan endi\u015fe duyuyordu.” Baz\u0131 endi\u015feli mevduat sahipleri para \u00e7ekmeye ba\u015flad\u0131.<\/p>\n

7 Temmuz 2008’de IndyMac, \u015firket blogunda \u015funlar\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klad\u0131:<\/p>\n

\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 12 May\u0131s 2008 \u00fc\u00e7 ayl\u0131k kazan\u00e7 raporundan bu yana sermaye art\u0131rmay\u0131 ba\u015faramam\u0131\u015ft\u0131;<\/p>\n

\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Banka ve tasarruf reg\u00fclat\u00f6rleri taraf\u0131ndan IndyMac Bank’\u0131n art\u0131k “yeterli sermayeli” olarak de\u011ferlendirilmedi\u011fi konusunda bilgilendirilmi\u015fti;<\/p>\n

IndyMac, hem perakende hem de toptan sat\u0131\u015f b\u00f6l\u00fcmlerinin kapat\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 duyurdu, yeni kredi sunumlar\u0131n\u0131 durdurdu ve 3.800 ki\u015fiyi i\u015ften \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131.<\/p>\n

FDIC, likidite endi\u015felerini gerek\u00e7e g\u00f6stererek 11 Temmuz 2008’de IndyMac Bank’e kayyum atad\u0131. IndyMac Bank’\u0131n varl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n, teminatl\u0131 y\u00fck\u00fcml\u00fcl\u00fcklerinin ve sigortal\u0131 mevduat hesaplar\u0131n\u0131n kontrol\u00fcn\u00fc \u00fcstlenmek i\u00e7in bir k\u00f6pr\u00fc banka, IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB kuruldu. FDIC, 14 Temmuz 2008’de IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB’yi a\u00e7ma planlar\u0131n\u0131 duyurdu. O zamana kadar, mevduat sahipleri sigortal\u0131 mevduatlar\u0131na ATM’ler, mevcut \u00e7ekler ve mevcut banka kartlar\u0131 arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla eri\u015febileceklerdi. Banka yeniden a\u00e7\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda telefon ve internet hesab\u0131 eri\u015fimi yeniden sa\u011fland\u0131. FDIC, 100.000 ABD dolar\u0131na kadar t\u00fcm sigortal\u0131 hesaplar\u0131n fonlar\u0131n\u0131 garanti etti ve yakla\u015f\u0131k 10.000 mevduat sahibine, 100.000 ABD dolar\u0131n\u0131 a\u015fan tutarlar\u0131n %50’sini garanti ederek, sigortal\u0131 tutar\u0131 a\u015fan \u00f6zel bir temett\u00fc avans\u0131 beyan etti. Yine de Indymac’in IMB Management Holdings’e sat\u0131lmay\u0131 beklemesine ra\u011fmen, Indymac’\u0131n tahmini 10.000 sigortas\u0131z mevduat sahibi 270 milyon $’\u0131n \u00fczerinde kay\u0131p ya\u015fad\u0131.<\/p>\n

32 milyar dolarl\u0131k varl\u0131\u011fa sahip IndyMac Bank, Amerikan tarihindeki en b\u00fcy\u00fck banka iflaslar\u0131ndan biriydi.<\/p>\n

IndyMac Bancorp, 31 Temmuz 2008’de B\u00f6l\u00fcm 7 iflas ba\u015fvurusunda bulundu.<\/p>\n

Ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta etkilenen \u015firketler, art\u0131k kredi piyasalar\u0131ndan finansman elde edemedikleri i\u00e7in Northern Rock ve Countrywide Financial gibi ev in\u015faat\u0131 ve ipotek kredisiyle do\u011frudan ilgilenenlerdi. 2007 ve 2008 y\u0131llar\u0131nda 100’\u00fcn \u00fczerinde ipotek kredisi veren iflas etti. Yat\u0131r\u0131m bankas\u0131 Bear Stearns’in Mart 2008’de \u00e7\u00f6kece\u011fine dair endi\u015feler, JP Morgan Chase’e yang\u0131n sat\u0131\u015f\u0131yla sonu\u00e7land\u0131. Finansal kurum krizi Eyl\u00fcl ve Ekim 2008’de zirveye ula\u015ft\u0131. Birka\u00e7 b\u00fcy\u00fck kurum ya ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z oldu, bask\u0131 alt\u0131nda sat\u0131n al\u0131nd\u0131 ya da h\u00fck\u00fcmetin eline ge\u00e7ti. Bunlar aras\u0131nda Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Washington Mutual, Wachovia, Citigroup ve AIG vard\u0131. Lehman Brothers’\u0131n ABD tarihindeki en b\u00fcy\u00fck iflas\u0131n\u0131 bildirmesinden \u00fc\u00e7 hafta sonra, 6 Ekim 2008’de Lehman’\u0131n eski CEO’su Richard S. Fuld Jr. kendisini G\u00f6zetim ve H\u00fck\u00fcmet Reformu Meclis Komitesi’ne ba\u015fkanl\u0131k eden California Demokrat Temsilcisi Henry A. Waxman’\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcnde buldu. Fuld, \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn kurban\u0131 oldu\u011funu s\u00f6yleyerek, firmas\u0131n\u0131 felakete u\u011fratmakla piyasalarda bir “g\u00fcven krizi”ni sorumlu tuttu.<\/p>\n

\u00d6nemli Kitaplar ve Filmler<\/h2>\n

\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 2006 y\u0131l\u0131nda, Peter Schiff, Wiley taraf\u0131ndan \u015eubat 2007’de yay\u0131nlanan Crash Proof: How to Profit From the Coming Economic Collapse adl\u0131 bir kitap yazd\u0131. Kitap, Amerika Birle\u015fik Devletleri konut balonuna yol a\u00e7an ekonomi ve konut piyasas\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7e\u015fitli \u00f6zelliklerini anlat\u0131yor ve yakla\u015fan d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015f konusunda uyar\u0131yor. Tahminlerin bir\u00e7o\u011fu ge\u00e7tikten sonra, 2009 y\u0131l\u0131nda, her b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcn sonunda bir “2009 g\u00fcncellemesi” eki i\u00e7eren Crash Proof 2.0 ba\u015fl\u0131kl\u0131 ikinci bir bask\u0131 yay\u0131nland\u0131. The New York Times En \u00c7ok Satanlar listesinde yer ald\u0131.<\/p>\n

\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Meltdown: Borsan\u0131n Neden \u00c7\u00f6kt\u00fc\u011f\u00fc, Ekonomi Neden Dibe Vurdu\u011fu ve H\u00fck\u00fcmetin Kurtarmas\u0131n\u0131n \u0130\u015fleri Daha K\u00f6t\u00fc Hale Getirece\u011fine Dair Bir Serbest Piyasa Bak\u0131\u015f\u0131, Thomas Woods taraf\u0131ndan \u015eubat 2009’da Regnery Publishing taraf\u0131ndan yay\u0131nland\u0131. 10 hafta boyunca The New York Times En \u00c7ok Satanlar listesinde yer ald\u0131.<\/p>\n

\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 2010 tarihli bir belgesel film olan Overdose: Bir Sonraki Finansal Kriz Hakk\u0131nda Bir Film, finansal krizin nas\u0131l ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ve bir\u00e7ok h\u00fck\u00fcmet taraf\u0131ndan uygulanan \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlerin bir sonraki krize nas\u0131l zemin haz\u0131rlad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 anlat\u0131yor. Film, Johan Norberg’in Financial Fiasco adl\u0131 kitab\u0131na dayan\u0131yor ve \u00f6zg\u00fcrl\u00fck\u00e7\u00fc d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnce kurulu\u015fu Cato Enstit\u00fcs\u00fc’nden finanse edilen Alan Greenspan’\u0131 konu al\u0131yor.<\/p>\n

\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Ekim 2010’da, Sony Pictures Classics taraf\u0131ndan Charles Ferguson’un y\u00f6netti\u011fi Inside Job adl\u0131 krizle ilgili bir belgesel film yay\u0131nland\u0131. 2011 y\u0131l\u0131nda 83. Akademi \u00d6d\u00fclleri’nde En \u0130yi Belgesel dal\u0131nda Akademi \u00d6d\u00fcl\u00fc’ne lay\u0131k g\u00f6r\u00fcld\u00fc.<\/p>\n

\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Michael Lewis, kriz hakk\u0131nda The Big Short adl\u0131 \u00e7ok satan kurgusal olmayan bir kitap yazd\u0131. 2015 y\u0131l\u0131nda ayn\u0131 adl\u0131 filme uyarland\u0131 ve En \u0130yi Uyarlama Senaryo Akademi \u00d6d\u00fcl\u00fc’n\u00fc kazand\u0131. Ortaya \u00e7\u0131kan bir nokta, piyasalar\u0131n d\u0131\u015f\u0131ndakilerin (yani ana ak\u0131m bir yat\u0131r\u0131m bankas\u0131nda \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmayanlar\u0131n) olaylar\u0131 ne \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde tahmin edebildi\u011fi ve genellikle daha az miyop oldu\u011fudur.<\/p>\n

\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Krizin patlak vermesinden \u00f6nceki gecede ge\u00e7en Margin Call, bir analistin firmalar\u0131n\u0131 ve muhtemelen t\u00fcm ekonomiyi mahvedebilecek bilgileri ke\u015ffettikten sonra hasar\u0131 kontrol alt\u0131na almaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131rken ge\u00e7en uykusuz bir 24 saat boyunca yat\u0131r\u0131mc\u0131lar\u0131 takip eden bir film.<\/p>\n

\u00b7\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 ABD belgesel program\u0131 Frontline, krizin \u00e7e\u015fitli y\u00f6nlerini ara\u015ft\u0131ran birka\u00e7 b\u00f6l\u00fcm \u00fcretti:<\/p>\n

o\u00a0\u00a0 “Inside the Meltdown” (Sezon 2009: B\u00f6l\u00fcm 8)<\/p>\n

o\u00a0\u00a0 “Ten Trillion and Counting” (Sezon 2009: B\u00f6l\u00fcm 9)<\/p>\n

o\u00a0\u00a0 “Breaking the Bank” (Sezon 2009: B\u00f6l\u00fcm 15)<\/p>\n

o\u00a0\u00a0 “The Warning” (Sezon 2009: B\u00f6l\u00fcm 2)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u00d6nceki B\u00f6l\u00fcm 2007 \u2013 2008 Finansal Krizi \u2013 4 i\u00e7in t\u0131klay\u0131n G\u00f6lge Bankac\u0131l\u0131k Sisteminin Patlamas\u0131 ve \u00c7\u00f6kmesi En riskli, en k\u00f6t\u00fc performans g\u00f6steren ipoteklerin “g\u00f6lge bankac\u0131l\u0131k sistemi” ile finanse edildi\u011fine ve g\u00f6lge bankac\u0131l\u0131k sisteminden gelen rekabetin, daha geleneksel kurumlara y\u00fcklenim standartlar\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrmeleri ve daha riskli krediler olu\u015fturmalar\u0131 i\u00e7in bask\u0131 yapm\u0131\u015f olabilece\u011fine dair g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc kan\u0131tlar var.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4,"featured_media":3727,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6,40],"tags":[85,84,82,83],"class_list":{"0":"post-3737","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-finansal-veri-okuryazarligi","8":"category-finansal-otomasyon","9":"tag-2008-krizi","10":"tag-emlak-balonu","11":"tag-emlak-krizi","12":"tag-mortgage-crisis"},"better_featured_image":{"id":3727,"alt_text":"ABD'de harcanabilir gelir, hane halklar\u0131n\u0131n bor\u00e7lar\u0131","caption":"","description":"","media_type":"image","media_details":{"width":640,"height":480,"file":"2022\/12\/Harcanabilir-gelir-ve-GSYIHye-gore-hanehalki-borcu.png","filesize":46646,"sizes":{"medium":{"file":"Harcanabilir-gelir-ve-GSYIHye-gore-hanehalki-borcu-300x225.png","width":300,"height":225,"mime-type":"image\/png","filesize":21950,"source_url":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/12\/Harcanabilir-gelir-ve-GSYIHye-gore-hanehalki-borcu-300x225.png"},"thumbnail":{"file":"Harcanabilir-gelir-ve-GSYIHye-gore-hanehalki-borcu-150x150.png","width":150,"height":150,"mime-type":"image\/png","filesize":8019,"source_url":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/12\/Harcanabilir-gelir-ve-GSYIHye-gore-hanehalki-borcu-150x150.png"},"bunyad-small":{"file":"Harcanabilir-gelir-ve-GSYIHye-gore-hanehalki-borcu-150x113.png","width":150,"height":113,"mime-type":"image\/png","filesize":7529,"source_url":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/12\/Harcanabilir-gelir-ve-GSYIHye-gore-hanehalki-borcu-150x113.png"},"bunyad-medium":{"file":"Harcanabilir-gelir-ve-GSYIHye-gore-hanehalki-borcu-450x338.png","width":450,"height":338,"mime-type":"image\/png","filesize":39690,"source_url":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/12\/Harcanabilir-gelir-ve-GSYIHye-gore-hanehalki-borcu-450x338.png"}},"image_meta":{"aperture":"0","credit":"","camera":"","caption":"","created_timestamp":"0","copyright":"","focal_length":"0","iso":"0","shutter_speed":"0","title":"","orientation":"0","keywords":[]}},"post":3723,"source_url":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/12\/Harcanabilir-gelir-ve-GSYIHye-gore-hanehalki-borcu.png"},"amp_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3737","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3737"}],"version-history":[{"count":10,"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3737\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5507,"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3737\/revisions\/5507"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3727"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3737"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3737"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3737"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}