{"id":4334,"date":"2023-04-19T23:37:51","date_gmt":"2023-04-19T20:37:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/?p=4334"},"modified":"2025-08-13T16:09:05","modified_gmt":"2025-08-13T13:09:05","slug":"arrow-imkansizlik-teoremi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/arrow-imkansizlik-teoremi\/","title":{"rendered":"Arrow \u0130mkans\u0131zl\u0131k Teoremi"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Arrow \u0130mkans\u0131zl\u0131k Teoremi<\/strong> Nedir? Pareto optimal da\u011f\u0131l\u0131mlardan hangisinin di\u011ferlerinden daha \u00fcst\u00fcn oldu\u011funu ve dolay\u0131s\u0131yla da di\u011ferlerine tercih edilmesi gerekti\u011fini belirlemeyi m\u00fcmk\u00fcn k\u0131lan sosyal refah fonksiyonu yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n temel g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc\u011f\u00fc, demokratik bir ortamda <a href=\"https:\/\/ms.hmb.gov.tr\/uploads\/2019\/09\/014.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">sosyal refah fonksiyonu<\/a> olu\u015fturman\u0131n asl\u0131nda imkans\u0131z olmas\u0131d\u0131r. Sosyal refah fonksiyonu yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n pratik de\u011ferini ortadan kald\u0131ran bu ele\u015ftiri, Nobel iktisat \u00f6d\u00fcl\u00fc sahibi <a href=\"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/kategori\/iktisat\/\">Amerikal\u0131 iktisat\u00e7\u0131 Kenneth J. Arrow<\/a> \u00a0taraf\u0131ndan ileri s\u00fcr\u00fclm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr. Arrow \u2018a g\u00f6re bir sosyal refah fonksiyonunun bireysel tercihleri yans\u0131tmas\u0131n\u0131n be\u015f ko\u015fulu vard\u0131r;<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Bireysel tercihler gibi sosyal ( toplumsal ) tercihler de taml\u0131k ve ge\u00e7i\u015flilik \u00f6zelliklerine sahip olmal\u0131d\u0131r.<\/li>\n<li>Bireysel tercihler ile sosyal refah tercihleri birbirlerinden ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z bir bi\u00e7imde dayat\u0131lmamal\u0131d\u0131r.<\/li>\n<li>Toplum A durumunu B durumuna sadece bir ki\u015fi istiyor diye tercih etmemelidir: Sosyal refah tercihleri bir ki\u015finin ( diktat\u00f6r ) tercihlerine dayanmamal\u0131d\u0131r.<\/li>\n<li>E\u011fer bireyler farkl\u0131 durumlar aras\u0131ndan A ve B durumlar\u0131n\u0131 tercih etmi\u015flerse ve daha sonra di\u011fer ki\u015filerin A tercihlerinde bir eksilme olmadan di\u011fer ki\u015fi ya da daha fazla ki\u015finin A tercihi de\u011fi\u015fip B durumunu tercih etmeleri \u015feklinde de\u011fi\u015fmi\u015fse, sosyal a\u00e7\u0131dan A tercihi B tercihine g\u00f6re yine tercih edilir.<\/li>\n<li>Bir sosyal refah tercihinin di\u011ferine g\u00f6re s\u0131ralamas\u0131 alternatif tercihlerden ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zd\u0131r: E\u011fer A, B, C gibi \u00fc\u00e7 durum s\u00f6z konusu iken A durumu B durumuna ve B durumu C durumuna tercih edilmi\u015fse, C durumu ortadan kalkt\u0131\u011f\u0131nda A durumu B durumuna yine tercih edilir.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Arrow \u2018a g\u00f6re bu ko\u015fullardan biri ihmal edilmeden bir sosyal tercih fonksiyonu olu\u015fturmak m\u00fcmk\u00fcn de\u011fildir ve bu husus Arrow imkans\u0131zl\u0131k teoremi diye nitelendirilir. Arrow imkans\u0131zl\u0131k teoreminin basit bir \u00f6rne\u011fi a\u015fa\u011f\u0131daki tabloda g\u00f6sterilmi\u015ftir;<\/p>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td rowspan=\"2\" width=\"154\"><strong>Ki\u015filer<\/strong><\/td>\n<td colspan=\"3\" width=\"461\"><strong>Tercihler<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"154\"><strong>A<\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"154\"><strong>B<\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"154\"><strong>C<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"154\">I<\/td>\n<td width=\"154\">1<\/td>\n<td width=\"154\">2<\/td>\n<td width=\"154\">3<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"154\">II<\/td>\n<td width=\"154\">2<\/td>\n<td width=\"154\">3<\/td>\n<td width=\"154\">1<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"154\">III<\/td>\n<td width=\"154\">3<\/td>\n<td width=\"154\">1<\/td>\n<td width=\"154\">2<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>Ki\u015filerin sosyal refah tercihleri konusunda farkl\u0131 tercihlere sahip olduklar\u0131 tabloda, \u00fc\u00e7 ki\u015finin \u00fc\u00e7 tercihe sahip olduklar\u0131 varsay\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Tabloya g\u00f6re birinci ki\u015finin, birinci, ikinci, \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc tercihleri s\u0131ras\u0131yla A, B, C \u2018dir. Buna kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k ikinci ki\u015finin birinci, ikinci, \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc tercihleri C, A, B \u2018dir. \u00dc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc ki\u015finin birinci, ikinci ve \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc tercihleri ise B, C ve A \u2018d\u0131r. Bu durumda A ve B durumlar\u0131 aras\u0131ndaki oylama sonucu, birinci ki\u015fi ve ikinci ki\u015fi A i\u00e7in \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc ki\u015fi ise B i\u00e7in oy kullan\u0131r ve dolay\u0131s\u0131yla A durumu B durumuna tercih edilir: A B. Buna kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k B ve C durumlar\u0131 aras\u0131ndaki oylama sonucunda, birinci ve \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc ki\u015fi B i\u00e7in ikinci ki\u015fi ise C i\u00e7in oy kullan\u0131r ve dolay\u0131s\u0131yla da B durumu C durumuna tercih edilir: B C. Son olarak A ve C durumlar\u0131 aras\u0131ndaki oylama sonucunda, ikinci ve \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc ki\u015fi C i\u00e7in birinci ki\u015fi ise A i\u00e7in oy kullan\u0131r ve C durumu A duruma tercih edilir: C A. B\u00f6ylece de 1 numaral\u0131 ge\u00e7i\u015flilik ko\u015fulu ihlal edilir.<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"3030\" data-end=\"3471\">Arrow\u2019un \u0130mkans\u0131zl\u0131k Teoremi, sosyal tercih teorisi ve kamu ekonomisi alan\u0131nda temel bir d\u00f6n\u00fcm noktas\u0131d\u0131r. Bu teorem, \u00e7o\u011funluk oylamas\u0131 veya benzeri demokratik mekanizmalarla toplumsal tercih s\u0131ralamas\u0131 yap\u0131lmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda, belirli makul ko\u015fullar alt\u0131nda tutarl\u0131 bir sonu\u00e7 elde etmenin m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 matematiksel olarak kan\u0131tlar. Bu, pratikte \u201cherkesin adil ve rasyonel olarak kabul edece\u011fi bir se\u00e7im y\u00f6ntemi yoktur\u201d anlam\u0131na gelir.<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"3473\" data-end=\"4003\">Teoremin \u00f6nemi, sadece teorik bir \u00e7er\u00e7eve sunmas\u0131nda de\u011fil, ayn\u0131 zamanda ger\u00e7ek d\u00fcnyadaki karar alma s\u00fcre\u00e7lerine \u0131\u015f\u0131k tutmas\u0131nda yatar. \u00d6rne\u011fin, se\u00e7im sistemleri, referandumlar, b\u00fct\u00e7e tahsisleri veya kamu politikas\u0131 \u00f6ncelikleri belirlenirken, farkl\u0131 gruplar\u0131n farkl\u0131 s\u0131ralamalar\u0131 ve \u00f6ncelikleri oldu\u011funda hangi karar\u0131n \u201ctoplumsal olarak en iyi\u201d oldu\u011funa dair nesnel bir y\u00f6ntem geli\u015ftirmek zordur. Arrow\u2019un \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmas\u0131, se\u00e7im sistemlerinin tasar\u0131m\u0131nda neden her y\u00f6ntemin kendi i\u00e7inde avantaj ve dezavantajlar bar\u0131nd\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6sterir.<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"4005\" data-end=\"4451\">Teoremin temel sonucu, en az \u00fc\u00e7 alternatifin oldu\u011fu ve bireylerin tercihlerinin serbest\u00e7e de\u011fi\u015febildi\u011fi durumlarda, hem diktat\u00f6rl\u00fckten ka\u00e7\u0131nan hem de mant\u0131ksal tutarl\u0131l\u0131\u011fa sahip bir sosyal tercih fonksiyonunun olu\u015fturulamayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ortaya koyar. Bu nedenle, demokratik sistemler genellikle baz\u0131 ko\u015fullardan \u00f6d\u00fcn verirler. \u00d6rne\u011fin, baz\u0131 se\u00e7im sistemleri ge\u00e7i\u015flilikten taviz verirken, baz\u0131lar\u0131 bireysel tercihlerden ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k ilkesini esnetebilir.<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"4453\" data-end=\"4842\">\u0130ktisat politikas\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan bu teorem, Pareto optimalite gibi refah kriterlerinin tek ba\u015f\u0131na yeterli olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131, \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc Pareto kriterinin hangi optimal \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcn \u201cdaha iyi\u201d oldu\u011funu belirlemede yetersiz kald\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6sterir. Dolay\u0131s\u0131yla, politika yap\u0131c\u0131lar sadece ekonomik verimlilik de\u011fil, ayn\u0131 zamanda siyasi me\u015fruiyet, toplumsal uzla\u015f\u0131 ve temsil gibi fakt\u00f6rleri de dikkate almak zorundad\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"4844\" data-end=\"5138\">Arrow\u2019un teoremi ayr\u0131ca oyun teorisi, kamu tercihi teorisi ve anayasa iktisad\u0131 alanlar\u0131nda geni\u015f yank\u0131 bulmu\u015ftur. James Buchanan ve Gordon Tullock gibi kamu tercihi teorisyenleri, bu teoremi demokratik s\u00fcre\u00e7lerin s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n\u0131 ve siyasi pazarl\u0131klar\u0131n ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131lmazl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamakta kullanm\u0131\u015flard\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"5140\" data-end=\"5588\">Matematiksel olarak, teoremin dayand\u0131\u011f\u0131 ispat y\u00f6ntemleri tercih s\u0131ralamalar\u0131n\u0131n kombinatoryal \u00f6zelliklerine dayan\u0131r. Her bireyin alternatifler \u00fczerinde bir s\u0131ralamas\u0131 vard\u0131r ve bu s\u0131ralamalar toplumsal bir s\u0131ralamaya d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcr\u00fclmek istenir. Ancak bu d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcm, be\u015f ko\u015fulun tamam\u0131n\u0131 ayn\u0131 anda sa\u011flayamaz. Bu ko\u015fullar ihlal edilirse, baz\u0131 sistemler pratikte \u00e7al\u0131\u015fabilir; ancak bu durumda da belirli adalet veya rasyonalite ilkelerinden vazge\u00e7ilmi\u015f olur.<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"5590\" data-end=\"6020\">Teoremin uygulamada yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131 sonu\u00e7lardan biri de, karar alma s\u00fcre\u00e7lerinin \u015feffafl\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve kat\u0131l\u0131mc\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n tek ba\u015f\u0131na \u201cm\u00fckemmel\u201d sonu\u00e7lar \u00fcretmeyece\u011finin anla\u015f\u0131lmas\u0131d\u0131r. Demokrasi, Arrow\u2019un teoreminin i\u015faret etti\u011fi s\u0131n\u0131rlara ra\u011fmen, toplumsal uzla\u015f\u0131y\u0131 en \u00fcst d\u00fczeye \u00e7\u0131karan y\u00f6ntemlerden biri olarak kabul edilir. Ancak bu s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131n fark\u0131nda olarak sistem tasarlamak, politika ve se\u00e7im m\u00fchendisli\u011fi a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan kritik \u00f6nemdedir.<\/p>\n<p data-start=\"6022\" data-end=\"6350\">Sonu\u00e7 olarak, Arrow \u0130mkans\u0131zl\u0131k Teoremi, sosyal bilimlerde \u201ckusursuz \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u201d aray\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n neden \u00e7o\u011fu zaman ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131\u011fa mahk\u00fbm oldu\u011funu a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a ortaya koyar. Bu teorem, se\u00e7im sistemlerinden kamu politikalar\u0131na kadar geni\u015f bir yelpazede, karar verme mekanizmalar\u0131n\u0131n tasar\u0131m\u0131nda temel bir referans noktas\u0131 olmaya devam etmektedir.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Arrow \u0130mkans\u0131zl\u0131k Teoremi Nedir? Pareto optimal da\u011f\u0131l\u0131mlardan hangisinin di\u011ferlerinden daha \u00fcst\u00fcn oldu\u011funu ve dolay\u0131s\u0131yla da di\u011ferlerine tercih edilmesi gerekti\u011fini belirlemeyi m\u00fcmk\u00fcn k\u0131lan sosyal refah fonksiyonu yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n temel g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc\u011f\u00fc, demokratik bir ortamda sosyal refah fonksiyonu olu\u015fturman\u0131n asl\u0131nda imkans\u0131z olmas\u0131d\u0131r. Sosyal refah fonksiyonu yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131n\u0131n pratik de\u011ferini ortadan kald\u0131ran bu ele\u015ftiri, Nobel iktisat \u00f6d\u00fcl\u00fc sahibi Amerikal\u0131 iktisat\u00e7\u0131 Kenneth<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":4335,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,47],"tags":[287,286,285],"class_list":{"0":"post-4334","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-jeoekonomik-makro-veriler","8":"category-makro-ekonomik-analizler","9":"tag-iktisat-sozlugu","10":"tag-iktisat-teoremleri","11":"tag-kenneth-j-arrow"},"better_featured_image":{"id":4335,"alt_text":"\u0130ktisat Teoremleri, Arrow imkans\u0131zl\u0131k teoremi","caption":"","description":"","media_type":"image","media_details":{"width":1920,"height":522,"file":"2023\/04\/Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi.png","filesize":47481,"sizes":{"medium":{"file":"Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-300x82.png","width":300,"height":82,"mime-type":"image\/png","filesize":8099,"source_url":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-300x82.png"},"large":{"file":"Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-1024x278.png","width":1024,"height":278,"mime-type":"image\/png","filesize":41075,"source_url":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-1024x278.png"},"thumbnail":{"file":"Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-150x150.png","width":150,"height":150,"mime-type":"image\/png","filesize":7903,"source_url":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-150x150.png"},"medium_large":{"file":"Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-768x209.png","width":768,"height":209,"mime-type":"image\/png","filesize":27672,"source_url":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-768x209.png"},"1536x1536":{"file":"Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-1536x418.png","width":1536,"height":418,"mime-type":"image\/png","filesize":65093,"source_url":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-1536x418.png"},"bunyad-small":{"file":"Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-150x41.png","width":150,"height":41,"mime-type":"image\/png","filesize":3397,"source_url":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-150x41.png"},"bunyad-medium":{"file":"Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-450x122.png","width":450,"height":122,"mime-type":"image\/png","filesize":13868,"source_url":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-450x122.png"},"bunyad-full":{"file":"Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-1200x326.png","width":1200,"height":326,"mime-type":"image\/png","filesize":49834,"source_url":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-1200x326.png"},"bunyad-768":{"file":"Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-768x209.png","width":768,"height":209,"mime-type":"image\/png","filesize":27672,"source_url":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi-768x209.png"}},"image_meta":{"aperture":"0","credit":"","camera":"","caption":"","created_timestamp":"0","copyright":"","focal_length":"0","iso":"0","shutter_speed":"0","title":"","orientation":"0","keywords":[]}},"post":4334,"source_url":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/04\/Arrow-Imkansizlik-Teoremi.png"},"amp_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4334","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4334"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4334\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":5529,"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4334\/revisions\/5529"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4335"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4334"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4334"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/datakapital.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4334"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}